Supervision of local government in Zimbabwe: The travails of mayors by Chigwata,  Tinashe Carlton et al.























Supervision of local 
government in 
Zimbabwe: The 
travails of mayors 
 
 
TINASHE CARLTON CHIGWATA 
Researcher, Dullah Omar Institute for 
Constitutional Law, Governance and 
Human Rights, University of the Western 
Cape, Bellville, South Africa 
 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1313-




Researcher, School of Postgraduate 
Studies, Research and Innovation, 
University of Johannesburg, 






Lecturer, Department of Political and 
Administrative Studies, University of 













VOLUME 23 (2019) 
 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/2077-
4907/2019/ldd.v23a3   
ISSN:  2077-4907 
 CC-BY 4.0 
LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT/ VOL 23 (2019) 
 
Page | 45  
 
ABSTRACT  
The discourse on decentralisation theoretically supports central government supervision 
of local government.  The exercise of such powers by the central government of Zimbabwe 
is mired in controversy. Mayors are often suspended and/or dismissed to safeguard so-
called “public interests”. In particular, those who are from the opposition political party, 
the Movement for Democratic Change, have been greatly affected in this regard. The 
supervisory interventions of the Zimbabwe African National Unity-Patriotic Front  led 
national (central) government have raised questions about the very existence of local 
democracy and the parameters within which supervision should be implemented. The 
inadequacy of the laws regulating central supervision over local government and, in some 
cases, the blatant disregard of such laws by the supervising authority have left mayors 
vulnerable to arbitrary suspensions and/or dismissal. Such interventions have been 
motivated mainly by sinister political objectives rather than a genuine desire to improve 
local governance. A case study methodology focusing on the supervision of mayors in 
Zimbabwe since independence has been adopted.  
  
Keywords: Local government, local autonomy, mayors, supervision, power politics, 
decentralisation, Zimbabwe 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s saw a wave of democratic decentralisation 
sweeping across Africa. New local governments were created whilst existing ones were 
strengthened. Throughout the continent, democratically elected subnational entities 
emerged. Under the leadership of local officials, such as mayors and chairpersons, local 
governments were assigned various powers and responsibilities. Nevertheless, national 
(central) governments retained substantial supervisory powers over local government. 
In Zimbabwe, the use of such supervisory powers by the national government has often 
been mired in controversy. The Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front 
(ZANU-PF) led national government often suspends and even dismisses mayors often in 
the name of preserving “public interests”. In what appears to be by design rather than 
coincidence, most of the suspended and dismissed mayors were aligned to the 
opposition political party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The 
supervisory interventions have certainly undermined local democracy. Questions have 
also arisen about the adequacy of the legislative framework within which central 
supervision is exercised. With the adoption of a new Constitution in 2013, hopes were 
raised that arbitrary supervision would be kept to the minimum and eliminated at best. 
This is yet to be realised in practice. The culture still persists well after adoption of the 
new Constitution which, among other things, is meant to promote local democracy, in 
particular by protecting locally elected officials from arbitrary suspension and removal 
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from office. The controversial exercise of supervisory powers has, over the years, 
undermined the role of local authorities in meeting their service delivery obligations.1 
In general, the suspension and dismissal of mayors in Zimbabwe seem to be less 
a reflection of genuine supervision but more a manifestation of power politics at play. In 
this regard, local government supervision has turned out to be a powerful tool for 
gaining political advantage at the disposal of the ZANU-PF led  national government.2 
Mayors that pose a real or perceived threat to central control often do not escape the 
“hard hand” of the national government. Ruling party officials are sometimes not 
immune to these political machinations. Naturally, the control of urban municipalities 
by opposition parties heightens prospects for a power struggle and amplifies the 
tension between national government and mayors. This explains why the frequency of 
harassment, suspension and dismissal intensified and the role of mayors was reviewed 
after the MDC took control of major urban councils in the early 2000s. The article 
situates the supervision of local government in the literature before briefly describing 
the system of local government in Zimbabwe. The theoretical framework is followed by 
an analysis of cases of mayoral supervision by national government since independence 
in 1980. The discussion ends with concluding remarks drawing general observations 
and policy implications.  
2. SITUATING THE USE OF SUPERVISORY POWERS: A THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
Decentralisation is associated with a number of benefits linked to democracy, 
development and peace.3 It can enhance democracy by widening opportunities for 
citizens to participate in governance and by holding governing authorities accountable.4 
Decentralisation serves as a peace-building and conflict management mechanism, 
especially in ethnically diverse societies, by providing a measure of self-government to 
minority groups.5 It can also improve the quality of the decisions on how public 
resources are deployed and thus can have a positive impact on citizens’ welfare.6 The 
potential of decentralisation to realise these and other benefits relies on the design of 
the decentralisation programme, the existence of sufficient political will and capacity, 
                                                 
1 Chakaipa S “Local government institutions and elections” in De Visser J, Steytler N & Machingauta N 
(eds) Local government in Zimbabwe: a policy dialogue (Bellville: Community Law Centre, University of 
the Western Cape 2010) at 31-68; Muchadenyika D & Williams J “Social change: urban governance and 
urbanisation in Zimbabwe” (2016) 27 Urban Forum 253 at 257-258. 
2 Jonga W & Chirisa I (2009) “Urban local governance in the crucible: empirical overtones of central 
government meddling in local urban councils affairs in Zimbabwe” (2009) 3(12) Theoretical and 
Empirical Researches in Urban Management 166 at 168.  
3 See Ladner A et al Patterns of local autonomy in Europe (London: Palgrave Macmillan 2018) at 6 and 8; 
Resnick D “Urban governance and service delivery in African cities: the role of politics and policies” 
(2014) 32(s1) Development Policy Review 3 at 6. 
4 Manor J “Understanding decentralisation: key issues for successful design” in Ojendal J & Dellnas A (eds) 
The imperative of good local governance: challenges for the next decade of decentralisation (New York: 
United Nations University Press 2013) at 33. 
5 Manor (2013) at 33. 
6 USAID Democratic decentralisation programming handbook (Washington DC: USAID 2009) at 5. 
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among other factors. The potential negative impacts of decentralisation, such as, 
corruption, decreasing stabilisation, and inequalities,   are equally recognised in the 
literature.7  
Normatively, when it comes to institutional design, scholars concur that if local 
government is to promote development, democracy and peace, it should enjoy a certain 
level of autonomy over the responsibilities which it has authority to discharge.8 While it 
is widely acknowledged that autonomy is important, there is, however, no agreement 
among scholars on what this concept entails. Chigwata and De Visser define autonomy 
as “the extent to which local governments have discretion in carrying out their duties 
and obligations”.9 They argue that the discretion applies to the raising and expenditure 
of revenue, appointment and dismissal of staff, determination of internal organisation, 
and adoption and implementation of laws and policies, among other things.10  Ladner et 
al consider local autonomy “as both as a right and an ability —as consisting of a series of 
sub-dimensions”.11  For them, local autonomy “implies the legal right to manage public 
affairs within the limits of the law but also the necessary political, administrative and 
financial resources that a local government should freely dispose of to carry them out 
effectively”.12 While scholars emphasise different aspects, it is undisputed that local 
autonomy “provides subnational officials with flexibility to respond more effectively to 
local conditions and the specific needs of local people”.13 There is also a general 
consensus that without a guaranteed level of local autonomy, the potential of 
decentralisation is limited. Most functioning municipalities “are positively related to 
local autonomy or—as it is assumed—are direct products of local autonomy”.14 Thus, 
local autonomy “has become something to be achieved, an aim responsible political 
leaders should crave for”.15 Mechanisms for protecting and promoting such autonomy 
become crucial, but are also subject to debate. 
Accountability, whether downward, horizontal or upward, is equally 
important.16 Mechanisms designed to promote local accountability provide the central 
link between formally decentralised institutions and citizens. Horizontal accountability 
relationships between the local administration and elected structures are crucial for 
effective performance.17 Importantly for the purposes of this article, the upward 
accountability of local governments to higher level governments, which is a relationship 
of supervision, is necessary in any decentralised system of government. This means that 
                                                 
7 See Ladner et al (2018) at 8,  
8 De Visser J Developmental local government: a case study of South Africa (Antwerpen-Oxford: Insentia 
2005) at 170, Manor (2013) at 32. 
9 Chigwata TC & De Visser J “Local government in the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe: defining the 
boundaries of local autonomy” (2018) 10 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 165 at 167. 
10 Chigwata & De Visser (2018) at 167-170. 
11 Ladner et al (2018) at 24. 
12 Ladner et al (2018) at 26. 
13 USAID (2009) at 7. 
14 Ladner et al (2018) at 6. 
15 Ladner et al (2018) at 6. 
16 Manor (2013) at 32. 
17 USAID (2009) at 8. 
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superior levels of government should have the right to supervise local government in 
order to rectify failures that are detrimental to the achievement of important local and 
national goals.18 For instance, national government should ensure that local 
governments comply with the prescribed national norms and standards relating to the 
provision of public services – water quality, health care and building standards. It 
should ensure that local governments comply with the rule of law with respect to the 
management of resources, citizens’ rights and governance procedures, such as, electoral 
processes, personnel issues and administrative establishment. Thus, local autonomy 
should not be construed to mean that local governments are free to take whatever 
decisions they want.19 Rather, it should always be bounded by constitutional, legislative 
and policy prescriptions. 
However, “not all failures should attract external intervention, as that would 
seriously compromise local democracy and the whole concept of representative 
governments at the local level”.20 The regulation and limitation of supervisory powers 
are important to protect local autonomy, which is likely to be compromised by 
unlimited supervisory powers. Thus, it is crucial to legally recognise that the use of 
supervisory powers by higher level government should only be exercised in accordance 
with procedures and in such cases as provided in the constitution and/or legislation.21 
Supervision takes many forms including regulation of, and intervention in, local affairs 
to address problems such as corruption and mismanagement. The disciplining of errant 
locally elected officials is to be expected under a decentralised system. There is no 
doubt that intervention measures, such as the suspension and/or dismissal of locally 
elected officials, have far-reaching consequences for local autonomy. It is primarily for 
this reason that some scholars have cautioned that the powers to intervene in local 
affairs by, for example, suspending or dismissing locally elected officials must be limited 
and strictly regulated.22 If not, such powers may be (ab)used to drive other objectives 
that are detrimental to local democracy. 
The (ab)use of supervisory powers to achieve political objectives has been a 
common practice in sub-Saharan Africa particularly when there is vertically divided 
authority. Vertically divided authority occurs when different political parties govern at 
the national and local levels.23  In most parts of Africa, vertically divided authority 
seems to have encouraged many central governments to “employ strategies of 
subversion, or tactics designed to limit the autonomy of sub-national officials while 
simultaneously increasing the culpability for poor service delivery”.24 These strategies 
are often justified in the name of “public interests” in order to obscure them from their 
                                                 
18 Machingauta N “Supervision of local government” in De Visser J, Steytler N & Machingauta N (eds) Local 
government in Zimbabwe: a policy dialogue (Bellville: Community Law Centre, University of the Western 
Cape 2010) at 140, De Visser (2005) at 170. 
19 Chigwata & De Visser (2018) at 170. 
20 Zimbabwe Institute Local government policy review, (unpublished, Cape Town 2005) at 8. 
21 UN-Habitat International guidelines on decentralisation and the strengthening of local authorities  
(Nairobi: UN-Habitat 2007) at 7. 
22 See De Visser (2005) at 170, Machingauta (2010) at 140. 
23 Resnick (2014) at 8. 
24 Resnick (2014) at 8. 
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political motivations. 25 The tactics include: converting opposition run capital cities into 
administrative cities directly managed by the centre,26 the nomination of a certain 
number of councillors by the centre,27 the deployment of centrally appointed public 
officials to manage local affairs alongside democratic councils, the arbitrary dismissal 
and/or suspension of local officials, the merger or division of councils,28 the unjustified 
delaying or blockage of intergovernmental grants, the recentralisation of key 
responsibilities that appeal politically, and the restriction of budget autonomy through 
unnecessary approval requirements. In such circumstances, the constitutional 
protection of local autonomy may be the most viable mechanism for defence against 
advances against local democracy. Constitutional protection offers perhaps the highest 
level of protection given the stringent procedures that usually apply when amending 
constitutional rather than legislative provisions. It provides a “basis for judicial 
enforcement of constitutional limits”.29 However, constitutional protection is likely to be 
effective only in an environment where there is respect for the rule of law. Otherwise, 
constitutional or legislative provisions and court judgements given to protect local 
autonomy can simply be ignored by national elites.30  
Constitutional protection can be afforded to safeguard in many ways selected 
local officials from over-assertive higher authorities. First, the grounds for suspension 
or removal of locally elected officials from office must be clearly and constitutionally 
defined. The guiding principle is that the use of supervisory powers should be kept in 
proportion to the importance of the interests which are intended to be protected.31 The 
suspension and/or removal of elected officials from office should be undertaken in 
accordance with due process of law.  Secondly, the period for which a mayor or 
councillor can be placed under suspension should be limited to avoid a situation where 
these local officials are suspended for an extended period or even indefinitely. The law 
should provide for the immediate resumption of duties by those local officials who have 
been suspended but found to be not guilty of any transgression. The suspension or 
dismissal of local officials should also be exercised subject to oversight by other 
independent bodies, such as, parliament and/or the judiciary.32 For instance, the 
suspension of local officials by the national executive can be reviewed by parliament or 
the courts to which appeal may be made. The role of such independent bodies can be 
effective in detecting and preventing abuse of supervisory powers.  
                                                 
25 Resnick (2014) at 8. 
26 For instance, in 2009, Uganda adopted legislation which converted the capital city of Kampala into an 
administrative city managed by the centre. 
27 This is a common practice in Botswana and Zimbabwe (before the adoption of the 2013 Constitution). 
28 See Resnick (2014) at 10, where he discusses the subdivision of urban councils in 2009 by President 
Wade of Senegal following their takeover by an opposition coalition. 
29 Chigwata & De Visser (2018) at 167. 
30 Chigwata & De Visser (2018) at 167-168. 
31 Council of Europe ”European Charter for Local Self-Government” European Treaty Series No. 122 
(Strasbourg:  Council of Europe Publishing1983) at 3. 
32 UN-Habitat (2007) at 7, Chigwata & De Visser (2018) at 170-171. 
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3. AN OVERVIEW OF THE SYSTEM OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ZIMBABWE 
In 1980, Zimbabwe inherited a system of local government in which local authorities 
enjoyed a mixture of delegated and devolved functions and powers. Local authorities 
were merely creatures of the national government and without constitutional 
recognition.33 This changed when the new Constitution of Zimbabwe (Constitution) was 
adopted in 2013, and, among other things, provides for a multilevel system of 
government. Under the new system, government is organised at the national, provincial 
and local levels with the provincial tier constituted by provincial and metropolitan 
councils while the local tier is composed of local authorities.34 The new Constitution 
requires devolution of powers, responsibilities and resources to these local authorities 
to attain a variety of objectives linked to development, democracy and peace.35 The 
Constitution further grants  local authorities the right to govern their respective 
communities with little involvement of the national government.36 Thus, the new 
Constitution has elevated the status of local government.  
The Constitution recognises two types of local government – urban and rural 
local authorities –which existed in Zimbabwe prior to its adoption.37 Urban local 
authorities enjoy greater autonomy and status than rural local authorities both in law 
and practice.38 Within the urban and rural forms of local government, several categories 
of local authorities can be established. Currently, there are three legally recognised 
categories of urban local authorities, namely: municipal councils (including cities), town 
councils and local boards – ranked in terms of powers, finance and discretion.39 All rural 
local authorities are of the same status – implying that they have equal powers and 
responsibilities. It is with regard to urban local authorities, particularly city and 
municipal councils, that there is provision for the role of a mayor, while in town 
councils, local boards and rural local authorities, the office of the chairperson is the 
equivalent. The institution of the office of mayor is recognised in section 277(2) of the 
Constitution, highlighting its significance in Zimbabwe. The Constitution permits the 
establishment of executive mayors, ceremonial mayors, or both. Executive mayors must 
be directly elected by the citizens of the relevant communities.40 Currently, mayors are 
ceremonial and are elected by councillors from the members of a council. While the 
legislative regime suggests that mayors do not have executive powers, in practice, 
especially in big cities, such as Harare and Bulawayo, they play a significant role and are 
quite influential.  
The Minister responsible for local government (Minister) is empowered by 
various pieces of legislation to supervise local government, including mayors. The 
                                                 
33 Zimbabwe Institute (2005) at 6. 
34 Constitution s 5. 
35 Constitution s 264(1). 
36 Constitution s 276. 
37 Constitution ss 274 & 275. 
38 Zimbabwe Institute (2005) at 7. 
39 Chakaipa (2010) at 36. 
40 Constitution s 274(5). 
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Minister can institute an investigation into council affairs, issue policy directives to local 
government, and rescind or suspend council resolutions and decisions.41 Before the 
adoption of the new Constitution in 2013, the Minister could both suspend and dismiss 
councillors and mayors. The Local Government Amendment Act of 2016 restricts the 
power of the Minister to only suspending councillors and mayors while the dismissal 
function is undertaken by an independent tribunal that the Minister establishes.42 While 
the disciplinary procedures have been reviewed, the bulk of the legislative provisions 
regulating local government still afford the Minister unfettered supervisory powers.43  
The exercise of these supervisory powers in practice has been controversial in 
many respects.44 Some of the supervisory mechanisms adopted, such as the power to 
issue directives, are sometimes exercised outside the legislative boundaries.45 For 
instance, just a week before the 2013 harmonised presidential, parliamentary and local 
elections, the then Minister, Ignatius Chombo, relying on section 313 of the Urban 
Councils Act,46 issued a directive to local authorities instructing them to write off debts 
owed by ratepayers.47 The provision empowers the Minister to issue a policy directive 
of a general character when it is desirable to further national interests. This directive 
was issued outside the law as section 313 of the Urban Councils  Act does not permit the 
national government to issue directives of such a specific nature.48 Jonga and Chirisa 
argue that directives have often been used by the national government as a major tool 
to amass political advantage.49 Their claim could be accurate given that the directive to 
write off debts seemed to have had a hidden objective of mobilising support for the 
ruling party, if its timing and illegality are taken into account. Another example of the 
lack of compliance with the rule of law relates to the practice of appointing commissions 
to administer local affairs in place of elected councils in Harare, Mutare and 
Chitungwiza between 2002 and 2007.50 The commissions had their respective terms of 
office continuously renewed even though the Urban Councils Act was clear that they can 
only be appointed for a limited period. 
Even in cases where there was a legal basis for the use of some of the 
supervisory powers, they were implemented inconsistently in respect of more or less 
the same type of failures or problems without offering any adequate explanation 
                                                 
41 Zimbabwe Institute (2005) at 4-5 and 8; Machingauta (2010) at 143-145; Chakaipa (2010) at 33. 
42 Local Government Amendment Act of 2016 ss 2 & 3. 
43 Chigwata & De Visser (2018) at 174, 179 and 184. 
44 See Jonga W “Prioritizing political banditry than good governance: rethinking urban governance in 
Zimbabwe” (2012) 2(24) International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 117 at 117-133. 
45 Chigwata TC, Muchapondwa VV & De Visser J “Ministerial directives to local government in Zimbabwe: 
top-down governance in a decentralised Constitution” (2017) 61(1) Journal of African Law 41 at 51-54. 
46 Chapter 29:15, Act 24 of 1995. 
47 Government of Zimbabwe, “Ministry of Local Government: Directive to write off debts, to all local 
authorities, 23 July 2013” (on file with the authors). 
48 See Chigwata, Muchapondwa & De Visser (2017) at 47-50. 
49 Jonga & Chirisa (2009) at 173. 
50 See Muchadenyika & Williams (2016) at 262, Jonga & Chirisa (2009) at 178, Chakaipa (2010) at 40. 
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thereof.51 Between 2002 and 2007, Minister Chombo dissolved a number of opposition 
party led councils on various allegations of corruption, abuse of office and 
mismanagement. These were replaced by administrators who were perceived to be 
sympathetic to, or supporters of, the ruling ZANU-PF.52 While these problems were 
rampant in all councils, including those administered by ZANU-PF led councils, very few 
councillors and mayors aligned to the ruling party were suspended and/or dismissed.53 
Thus, the extent to which some of the supervisory measures were undertaken to 
promote genuine local or national objectives is debatable. This is partially the reason 
why some scholars, such as, Makumbe, Jonga and Chirisa, are in agreement that since 
independence the supervision of local government has largely been influenced or 
motivated by ZANU-PF‘s desire to gain a political advantage.54 The article demonstrates 
how mayors in Zimbabwe have been vulnerable to an over-assertive national 
government that seems to have little regard for democratic governance. The adverse 
impact of such over-assertiveness on local democracy has been huge. 
Under the previous constitutional order, section 114 of the Urban Councils Act 
provided for the suspension and dismissal of mayors on various grounds, such as 
corruption and mismanagement. The Act did not permit the Minister to suspend or 
dismiss mayors where there was no legal basis for doing so. It further limited the 
suspension period to 45 days, therefore preventing a situation where a mayor could be 
suspended indefinitely. However, the safeguards provided by the law against arbitrary 
removal of mayors were, weak given that the Urban Councils Act lent itself to broad 
interpretation of the power to suspend or dismiss mayors, and provided scope for 
potential abuse.55 This weakness was to a certain extent resolved by the 2013 
Constitution which seeks to safeguard locally elected officials from arbitrary 
suspensions and/or dismissals.56 The safeguards are provided for in two ways. First, the 
Constitution provides for the removal of mayors and councillors only by an independent 
tribunal. Secondly, it explicitly defines the substantive grounds upon which mayors and 
councillors may be removed from office. These are: inability to perform the functions of 
their office due to mental or physical incapacity, gross incompetence, conviction of an 
offence involving dishonesty, corruption or abuse of office, or wilful violation of the law, 
including local authority by-laws. In 2016, the Local Government Amendment Act 
attempted to bring the Urban Councils Act in line with these new constitutional 
requirements in as far as the disciplining of local politicians is concerned. The Act, 
however, fails to provide full protection for locally elected officials as it, among other 
weaknesses, provides an expansive role for the Minister in the disciplinary procedures 
                                                 
51 Magaisa A “Welcome to the ‘rule of law’: made in Zimbabwe” (2016) available at 
https://www.bigsr.co.uk/single-post/2016/06/29/Welcome-to-the-%E2%80%9Crule-of-
law%E2%80%9D-made-in-Zimbabwe 
  (accessed 10 March 2019), Zimbabwe Institute (2005) at 8. 
52 Jonga & Chirisa (2009) at 167and 177. 
53 Jonga (2012) at 126. 
54 Makumbe J “Chombo destroying councils” (2006) 1(1) The Crisis Informer 3 at 3, Jonga & Chirisa (2009) 
at 168, Jonga (2012) at 122-123, Machingauta (2010) at 147. 
55 See Chakaipa (2010) at 40. 
56 Chigwata & De Visser (2018) at 176. 
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relating to councillors and mayors which the 2016 Constitution does not seem to 
permit.57 Under the Act, the Minister retains the power to suspend mayors and 
councillors. The Minister is also empowered to appoint an independent tribunal, which 
decides on whether or not a councillor or mayor should be dismissed. Thus, as the 
following discussion will show, whereas constitutional and legislative safeguards are 
there, there are still loopholes available for potential abuse of the supervisory powers 
over mayors. 
4. THE TOLERANCE OF MAYORS BUT FOR PATRICK KOMBAYI (1980-1989) 
From 1980 to 1989, city and municipal councils in Zimbabwe were presided over by 
ceremonial mayors who had very limited powers. Executive powers were shared 
between the Minister and the Town Clerk in whose appointment national government is 
involved. As a consequence, the Minister could determine policy priorities in the 
administration of cities and towns and control their day-to-day activities.58 A major 
downside of this system was that it limited the role and influence of mayors, creating a 
leadership vacuum that national government was happy to fill. Naturally, the ZANU (PF) 
led government managed to acquire the allegiance of mayors even in those urban 
councils controlled by the opposition – the Zimbabwe African People’s Union-Patriotic 
Front (PF-ZAPU). The exception was Patrick Kombayi, mayor of the City of Gweru, who 
was dismissed under controversial circumstances soon after independence.59 The 
mayor, who was a ZANU-PF member, was dismissed by the Minister on allegations of 
gross mismanagement of council funds.60 On the contrary, it is argued by some that 
Kombayi’s dismissal was nothing other than a political gimmick orchestrated by then 
Prime Minister Robert Mugabe himself.61 In response, the whole council resigned in 
solidarity with the mayor, which suggests that the dismissal was widely disapproved 
of.62  
The dismissal of Kombayi raised eyebrows considering that he was a senior 
ZANU-PF member who had worked hard in the liberation struggle and had earned the 
trust of the ruling party.63 During the liberation struggle, Kombayi was already a 
thriving businessman, who could afford to generously support the liberation 
movements with funds and important resources. It is alleged that due to these activities, 
                                                 
57 Chigwata & De Visser (2018) at 177-178. 
58 See Chakaipa (2010) at 33. 
59 Mhlahlo S R “Assessment of urban governance in Zimbabwe: case of the city of Gweru” (2007) 
XX111(1) EASSRR 107 at 116. 
60 Dzehonye E The dynamics of decentralisation on development planning in urban local authorities: a case 
study of Harare City Council (unpublished MA thesis, Midlands State University, Zimbabwe, 2013) at 7. 
61 See Karekwaivanane GH Struggle over state resources in Zimbabwe: law and politics since 1950 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2017) at 92. 
62 Chakaipa (2010) at 40. 
63 Parliament of Zimbabwe “National Assembly Hansard - 28 July 2009 Vol. 35 NO. 39” available at 
https://www.parlzim.gov.zw/national-assembly-hansard/national-assembly-hansard-28-july-2009-vol-
35-no-39 (accessed 04 August 2019). 
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he was seen as harbouring ambitions to lead ZANU-PF, especially during détente.64 After 
independence, his business activities in the City of Gweru strategically positioned him 
for a senior council position as ownership of immovable property was a required 
qualification that most blacks did not meet. During his tenure as mayor of Gweru, he 
was committed to local development, participating in a number of projects that elevated 
the development status of the city, including construction of Kudzanai bus terminus, a 
number of road networks, and establishment of Ivene Township.65 Accordingly, by the 
time he was ousted, rumours of him overshadowing senior party members with his 
popularity in the City of Gweru were circulating.66 The protest by his fellow councillors 
was an unusual display of insubordination and acrimony where junior members of the 
party (ZANU-PF councillors) openly disapproved the decision of their superior (the 
Minister). This suggests that the mayor’s dismissal had undertones of power politicking 
by senior members of the party and might accordingly have been something less than a 
matter of genuine local government supervision. The developments in Harare City 
Council ten years later equally support this argument as the Minister was reluctant to 
dismiss a mayor who had presided over deplorable service standards and alleged 
corrupt activities; a sign that the government was inconsistent.67  
5. TOLERANCE OF MAYORS UNDER DE FACTO ONE-PARTY RULE (1990-
1999) 
The period between 1990 and 1999 saw a shift in government’s decentralisation policy 
in Zimbabwe.68 There was a move towards democratising and empowering local 
government, with one of the most significant changes being the 1996 amendment to the 
Urban Councils Act, which provided for directly elected executive mayors. Since 
independence, political competition was mainly between ZANU-PF and ZAPU. In 1987, 
the two parties entered into an agreement that saw them merging into a single party – 
ZANU-PF. Dubbed the Unity Accord, this agreement signalled the birth of a de facto one-
party State. In the subsequent elections, opposition to ZANU-PF became so weak that in 
1995, 55 out of 120 members of parliament were elected unopposed.69  
In 1996, the government conferred executive powers on mayors, changing the 
power structure in urban local government. Whereas ceremonial mayors stayed clear of 
the management of a city, executive mayors were involved in its day-to-day running. 
Under the ceremonial mayoral system, major council decisions took the form of full 
council resolutions. Conversely, in the executive mayoral system, local authorities did 
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not have to wait for a full council resolution to make important decisions.70 Working 
through the executive committee, which was chaired by the mayor, the council could 
make major decisions ahead of full council sittings. The executive committee consisted 
of the mayor and all chairpersons of council committees.71 Contrary to their ceremonial 
counterparts who were mere signatories, convenors of council meetings and guests of 
honours at council events, executive mayors had an elevated level of influence and 
control because of their executive powers.  With this new range of influence and control 
over cities and municipal councils with huge budgets, large staff establishments and a 
wide array of functions, the mayoral position became a competing centre of power. The 
power and strategic importance of the position was perhaps vividly demonstrated in 
the appointment, rise and fall of Solomon Tawengwa, mayor of the City of Harare.  
          From 1981, Tawengwa was a councillor in the City of Harare. He rose to the 
position of ceremonial mayor in 1986, a position he abandoned in 1988 when he opted 
for a more prestigious position as a Member of Parliament.72 He returned to the Harare 
City Council in 1995 when the position of executive mayor was introduced, becoming 
the first executive mayor of Harare. The decision to abandon a parliamentary position 
for a local government mayoral position attested to the powerfulness of local 
government under an executive mayoral system. If Tawengwa’s decision was a 
calculated move then he was not far off the mark. The appointment earned him a 
promotion to ZANU-PF’s highest decision-making authority - the Politburo- as deputy 
secretary for finance.73 
Although the introduction of executive mayors had strengthened local 
government, it was not followed by an improvement in service delivery.74 The City of 
Harare, for instance, often went for weeks without water, refuse collection was erratic, 
potholes were not repaired, and council was months behind in its salary obligations.75 
Even though Tawengwa presided over deteriorating service delivery, corruption and 
scandals, there was reluctance on the part of the Minister to dismiss him. One of the 
factors protecting him was the important role he played as a senior member of ZANU-
PF’s Politburo.76 It was not until 1998 that a commission of inquiry was established to 
investigate the state of service delivery and administration in the City of Harare – the 
Thompson Commission. The Commission found the mayor guilty of “gross dereliction of 
duty and mismanagement” of council affairs.77 He was eventually ousted together with 
his council for gross dereliction of duty and mismanagement of the affairs of the City of 
Harare. Unlike Kombayi’s dismissal, the demise of Tawengwa was largely engineered by 
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the Combined Harare Residents Association whilst the Ministry for Local Government 
appeared to turn both a blind eye and a deaf ear to the “elephant in the room”.78 The 
only explanation then was that Tawengwa had maintained cordial relations with the 
national government and had been immune to its sweeping supervisory powers.  
After the dismissal of Tawengwa and his entire council, the national government 
was reluctant to replace him with another mayor elected by residents. Instead, it opted 
for a centrally appointed commission (the Elijah Chanakira Commission) to take over 
the management of the city.79 The Commission consisted of persons who were 
perceived to be sympathisers of ZANU-PF. It was not given a time frame within which to 
turn around service delivery and set the council on a healthy path. Elections to fill the 
position of executive mayor were suspended indefinitely. Without an elected council in 
place, the national government was able to exercise direct control of the city without 
being held to account by residents. Save for the case of Tawengwa, the relationship 
between the national government and mayors was cordial throughout the 1990s. This 
can be attributed to the fact that Zimbabwe was essentially a one-party State with no 
competitive opposition political parties. However, relations became acrimonious when 
a strong opposition – the MDC - emerged in 1999. 
6. THE RISE OF OPPOSITION MAYORS (2000-2008)  
The application of central government supervision in a ubiquitous and blatant manner 
came to the fore in 2000. The sparks that ignited the inferno were the 2000 and 2002 
local government elections held across the country and in Harare, respectively. For the 
first time in the electoral history of post-independence Zimbabwe, all urban wards and 
city councils were won by mayors and councillors representing the new opposition 
MDC. In Harare, Elias Mudzuri of MDC defeated Amos Midzi of ZANU-PF to become the 
first elected executive mayor of the capital city representing an opposition political 
party. However, as soon as Mudzuri settled into his influential position, a bruising 
power struggle commenced with Minister Ignatius Chombo. At its centre was the 
question of national government allocating to executive mayors more powers than 
necessary which were now “open to abuse”. The role of national government was 
confined largely to the management of the macro-environment whilst the opposition 
aligned executive mayors took effective control of matters at the local government level. 
This was not to be, as the Minister continued to follow the old practice in which he 
influenced the affairs of the city through various mechanisms, such as ministerial 
directives.80  
On 15 April 2003, the Minister suspended Mayor Mudzuri and ordered him to 
vacate his office and council house within seven days. The Minister relied on section 
54(2) of the Urban Councils Act which at the time empowered him to suspend a mayor 
if he was satisfied that the mayor was guilty of a conduct that rendered him unsuitable 
to occupy that office.  The reasons for the suspension of Mayor Mudzuri were given as 
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being: corruption, abuse of power, improper dismissal of council staff, improper tender 
procedures, and failure to cooperate with national government.81 These reasons were 
not substantiated and the mayor was not given an opportunity to defend himself. The 
dismissal caused outrage as the Minister’s compliance with due process of law was in 
question, furthering suspicions that his intervention might have been politically 
motivated.82 In the wake of the suspension of the Mayor, the Minister set up a nine 
member Commission chaired by Jameson Kurasha to commence investigations.83 In a 
move that raised rule of law questions, the Kurasha Commission continued with its 
investigation even though a High Court ruling had declared that the Commission was 
improperly established and that its findings could not be used to relieve the Mayor of 
his duties. To circumvent the ruling, the Minister appointed another Commission 
headed by Johannes Tomana to investigate the Mayor. The three member Commission 
was tasked with considering allegations against the mayor and recommending whether 
to relieve him of his duties. The Commission was constituted of members who were 
seemingly sympathetic to the Minister. Thus, the independence of the Commission and, 
therefore, its ability to preside over a just and fair process was compromised. It is for 
this reason that the Mayor refused to appear before the Commission. The Commission, 
nevertheless, recommended his dismissal. The recommendation was troubling if the 
Commission’s failure to follow due process of law is taken into account. The 
appointment of numerous investigation bodies and the ease with which  due process of 
the law was not followed, among other reasons, suggested that the national government 
was determined to dismiss the Mayor for what seemed to be political reasons rather 
than public interests.84 
With Mudzuri removed from the mayoral office, national government appointed 
deputy mayor, Sekesai Makwavarara, as acting mayor. Although Makwavarara was 
being investigated for corruption by her party, the MDC, the Minister elevated her to be 
chairperson of the Commission running the affairs of the City of Harare.85 The legality of 
the Makwavarara Commission came under scrutiny when the Commission fired Harare 
Town Clerk Nomutsa Chideya on allegations of incompetence. Chideya took the case to 
court arguing that the Commission could not dismiss him because it was not an elected 
council and that its chairperson could not exercise that authority as she was not an 
elected mayor.86 Agreeing with Chideya, Justice Lawrence Kamocha ruled that the 
Commission was illegal and that it did not have the authority to make any decisions 
adversely affecting the contractual rights, statutory rights and powers of Chideya in his 
position and capacity as town clerk.87 However, in spite of the ruling and contrary to the 
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court order, Chideya was not reinstated.  The term of office of the Commission was 
continuously renewed against provisions of the Urban Councils Act. Thus, elections, a 
viable tool available to local residents to replace dismissed local leaders, were 
unavailable due to this unlawful conduct.88  
The national government’s compliance with due process of law was also 
questioned with respect to the suspension and dismissal of other mayors aligned to the 
MDC.  This was evident in the decision by the Minister to forcibly evict Misheck 
Kagurabadza, as the executive mayor of the City of Mutare, in 2005.89 Kagurabadza, like 
Mudzuri,, was accused of corruption and abuse of mayoral powers. None of the 
accusations were substantiated or investigated by an independent body as provided by 
law. Kagurabadza was not given an opportunity to defend himself in court Soon after 
the removal of Kagurabadza, the Minister further dismissed all the elected councillors of 
the City of Mutare and replaced them with a five member Commission headed by 
Kenneth Saruchera. Both dismissals raised questions about the parameters within 
which decisions relating to suspension and dismissal were framed and implemented.  
In Chitungwiza, the Minister sacked Executive Mayor Gilbert Shoko (also of the 
MDC), and a pro-ZANU-PF politician who was appointed to take over in 2006.90 In 
Chegutu, another MDC affiliated mayor, Francis Dhlakama, was similarly dismissed. The 
template for the dismissals of Shoko and Dhlakama was almost identical to that used in 
the dismissals of the mayors of Harare and Mutare. The practice of appointing non-
elected people, in place of democratically elected officials, to administer councils, which 
was challenged in the courts several times,91 raises questions about ordinary citizens 
wielding influence over local politics. The same apply to the fact that the decisions of the 
Minister on suspension and dismissal were arbitrary and not subject to oversight by 
either Parliament or the courts. It would appear that the Minister was emboldened in 
deciding who was to be suspended and dismissed. Although mayors Abel Chayamiti and 
Japhet Ndabeni-Ncube of the cities of Masvingo and Bulawayo, respectively, were not 
dismissed, they were harassed.92  
From 2005 national government created the position of governor for the 
metropolitan cities of Harare and Bulawayo which were also gazetted as provinces, 
bringing to ten the number of provinces in the country. Despite the fact that all 
parliamentary constituencies and local government wards in the two metropolitan 
cities had been won by the opposition, the national government, nevertheless, 
appointed ruling party members as provincial governors (now re-named ministers of 
State for provincial affairs). A number of scholars perceive the introduction of the 
governors in the two metropolitan cities to be a move which was designed to neutralise 
the influence of the opposition and to regain control of these cities.93 Thereafter , 
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national government created the positions of district and provincial administrator for 
these metropolitan cities. Government’s explanation was that these officials would 
facilitate residents of the metropolitan cities becoming more involved in local 
government affairs. What was not explained was the rationale for appointing provincial 
governors given that coordination was already a function assigned to provincial 
administrators. There seem to have been no valid rationale for appointing district 
administrators when metropolitan cities already had officials responsible for 
coordinating service delivery in their areas of jurisdiction.  
Provincial and district administrators are responsible for coordinating the 
activities of the Ministry responsible for local government at the provincial and district 
level, respectively.94 In reality, however, they coordinate the functions of all government 
ministries at their respective levels.  They all have a role to play in the supervision of 
local authorities in their respective jurisdictions. Provincial governors, like provincial 
and district administrators, report to national government. However, whereas the 
administrators report to national government through the Minister, provincial 
governors reported directly to the president. By appointing so many officials, national 
government was over-emphasising its statutory use of supervisory powers to achieve 
firm control over local authorities.95 These administrative measures were 
complemented by legal reform which saw national government abolishing, through 
amendment of the Urban Councils Act, the post of executive mayor in 2008. Legal 
reform then provided for the post of ceremonial mayor, elected from amongst or 
outside the membership of the council, reverting to the pre-1996 situation. A number of 
scholars argue that this legal re-engineering was invoked not necessarily to improve 
local governance but insidiously to “dehorn” (opposition) mayors and make them as 
“toothless” as possible.96 Thus, the period 2000-2008 is perhaps one of the darkest 
seasons for mayors in Zimbabwe with profound adverse effects on local democracy in 
Zimbabwe. 
7. NO RESPITE FOR MAYORS NOTWITHSTANDING THE GOVERNMENT OF 
NATIONAL UNITY (2009-2013) 
 Following a disputed presidential election in 2008, ZANU-PF and two MDC political 
formations (MDC-T and MDC-M) entered into a power sharing arrangement under a 
Government of National Unity (GNU). When the GNU was established in 2009, Ignatius 
Chombo of ZANU-PF retained his position as the Minister responsible for local 
government and a new Deputy Minister, Sesel Zvidzai, representing the MDC was 
appointed. The representation of both ZANU-PF and the MDC in government and the 
spirit of working together usually associated with power sharing arrangements 
suggested a moratorium on the excessive use of supervisory powers. Despite the 
coalition government, a number of mayors, the majority of whom were aligned with the 
MDC, were suspended and/or dismissed on the basis of various allegations. For 
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instance, in 2009, the Mayor of Chitungwiza Municipality, Israel Marange, was 
dismissed for corruption. He was later convicted and sentenced to a prison term.97 The 
case of Mayor Marange demonstrates that supervisory powers are necessary to deal 
with errant local officials. Early in 2012, the Minister suspended Mutare Mayor, Brian 
James, on allegations of misconduct. The Mayor of Gwanda, Lionel De Necker, was also 
dismissed for his failure to comply with a ministerial directive to appoint an individual 
widely perceived to be a ruling party functionary, as the Chamber Secretary of the 
council. The Mayor and Deputy Mayor of Chinhoyi Municipality were also suspended in 
the same year on various allegations.98 As Zimbabwe moved towards adoption of a new 
constitution and as another election beckoned on the horizon, the Minister’s use of 
supervisory powers to achieve certain political outcomes which favoured his party was 
seemingly re-activated. The directive to write off debts discussed above is one example 
of abuse of supervisory powers. However, the suspension and/or dismissal of mayors 
during the period 2009 to 2013 did not reach a high level, at least in comparison with 
the period 2000-2008. Thus, there was relative stability at the local level.  
8. CONTINUATION OF VULNERABILITY DESPITE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROTECTION (2013-2018) 
Following the adoption of a new Constitution in May 2013, preparations got underway 
for another set of harmonised presidential, parliamentary and local government 
elections. These elections were won by ZANU-PF with a majority in both houses of 
Parliament, and with Robert Mugabe acquiring 61 percent of the presidential vote.99 At 
the local level, ZANU-PF won 1493  of 1958 wards, but failed to secure majorities in the 
councils of Harare, Gweru, Bulawayo and Chitungwiza.100 The MDC acquired a majority 
in most local councils in major urban areas. After a cabinet reshuffle, Chombo was 
redeployed to the Home Affairs portfolio while the then ZANU-PF political commissar, 
Savior Kasukuwere, was appointed as the new Minister responsible for local 
government. Like his predecessor, Kasukuwere continued with the politicisation of 
supervisory powers over local government, purportedly to protect the interests of 
citizens. 
The first casualty of the Kasukuwere era was Hamutendi Kombayi, the Mayor of 
Gweru, who in 2015 was suspended together with the Deputy Mayor and other 
councillors on allegations of gross incompetence, mismanagement and corruption.101 In 
suspending the MDC aligned Mayor and councillors, the Minister relied on the powers 
granted to him under section 114 of the Urban Councils Act, which then was not as yet 
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aligned with the new Constitution. In September 2015, the suspended Mayor and the 
councillors approached the courts seeking an order declaring their suspension 
unlawful. They argued that the Minister no longer has the power to discipline locally 
elected officials under the new constitutional order, and that thus they should be 
reinstated in their respective positions.102 The Court made an interim order in their 
favour. The order was confirmed in January 2016 by the Bulawayo High Court which 
ruled that the Minister no longer has the power to suspend or dismiss locally elected 
mayors as that is reserved for an independent tribunal provided for by section 278 (2) 
of  the Constitution.103 The Court further set aside the suspension and ordered the 
reinstatement of the mayor and councillors.104 Initially, the Minister did not implement 
this court order arguing that he had appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of 
Appeal.105 He later withdrew the appeal but still failed to implement the judgment of the 
Court. The conduct of the Minister in this case raises rule of law questions as the 
judgment was never overturned by a higher court – the only circumstance under which 
the non-implementation of a court order is acceptable and legal. This leads to the 
conclusion that the Minister’s actions were largely informed by an ulterior motive 
related to the settling of political scores. In 2017, the Court (re)directed the national 
government to reinstate Mayor Kombayi and some councillors to their respective 
positions. 
On 20 April 2016, the Minister suspended the Mayor of Harare, Bernard 
Manyenyeni (also of the MDC), for his alleged failure to follow the prescribed legal 
procedure when the city appointed James Mushore as its town clerk .106 Manyenyeni 
contested his suspension in court, arguing that the Minister no longer had the power to 
suspend and dismiss mayors under the new constitutional order.107 The Court 
dismissed the application. It held that the Minister could still suspend mayors but what 
he could not do was to dismiss them.108 This court ruling is controversial in many 
respects, especially in the light of earlier judgments handed down by it in a similar case 
– the Gweru case. The judgment was viewed as a threat to local democracy as it 
legitimises the power of national government to suspend locally elected officials at will, 
powers which it does not seem to have under the new constitutional dispensation.109 
The Court, however, declared that the suspension of the Mayor lapses after 45 days if 
the grounds for dismissal have not been established by an independent tribunal. In this 
case, the 45-day prescribed period lapsed before the tribunal was put in place even 
though the government tried to fast track the passage of a bill through Parliament 
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providing for the establishment and role of the tribunal. Manyenyeni returned to occupy 
the position of Mayor of Harare on 6 June 2016. 
Manyenyeni was served with another suspension letter immediately after 
resuming his duties as mayor. The circumstances under which the mayor was re-
suspended are remarkable. First, he was re-suspended not on the basis of the earlier 
grounds but for his alleged failure to implement the findings of a two-year old audit 
report which exposed corruption. Secondly, he  was re-suspended not by Minister 
Kasukuwere but by Minister Jonathan Moyo, who was the acting Minister for local 
government at that time. After the re-suspension, the Mayor approached the courts for 
an order declaring his re-suspension unlawful. He argued that section 114 of the Urban 
Councils Act did not allow the Minister to (re)suspend a mayor on grounds which were 
already known when the initial suspension occurred.110 The Court ruled in his favour 
and further interdicted the Minister from suspending him.111 This Court judgment was a 
victory for local democracy in Zimbabwe. The celebration of this court victory was, 
however, short-lived as the Mayor was arrested and detained by the Zimbabwe Anti-
Corruption Commission (ZACC), as soon as he left the court chambers.112 It was the first 
time that the Commission had actually arrested and charged any person in such a 
manner, giving weight to the argument that the arrest may have been politically 
motivated. When the mayor was brought to court on charges of criminal abuse of office, 
the judge dismissed the case. The Court bemoaned the manner in which the case had 
been handled by ZACC, the police and the prosecuting authority, particularly the arrest 
of the mayor in the absence of solid incriminating evidence. Moreover, he had been 
detained for more than 48 hours before being brought before a competent court as 
required by the Constitution, and therefore he had to be released immediately.113 
What is clear from Mayor Manyenyeni’s case, which is similar to the case of 
Mayor Mudzuri discussed above, is that the ZANU-PF led government was determined 
to suspend Manyenyeni at all costs and possibly remove him from office. Neither the 
basis for the suspensions nor who suspended him was of any importance. Thus, the 
ZANU-PF led national government’s motive might not have been genuine supervision to 
protect the interests of Harare residents but a well- calculated move to harass political 
adversaries as has been common since independence.114 Minister Kasukuwere went on 
to suspend the deputy mayor of Bulawayo, together with four other councillors on 
corruption related charges. Evidence suggested that the intolerance of mayors was 
likely to continue for as long as the political environment remained unchanged. The 
environment changed with the resignation of President Robert Mugabe in November 
2017. Emmerson Mnangagwa, who took over the leadership of both ZANU-PF and the 
government, committed himself to adopt a new course in a bid to transform the political 
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and economic landscape. The new President, Emmerson Mnangagwa, was re-elected in 
the July 2018 harmonised elections, although under disputed circumstances, as has 
been the case since the MDC entered the political arena. The new Minister responsible 
for local government in Mnangagwa’s Cabinet, July Moyo, although from ZANU-PF, 
declared that he would follow a path different to that of his predecessors regarding the 
disciplining of local political officials. It is, however, still too early to conclude whether 
July Moyo’s reformist stance will improve local government. 
9. CONCLUSION 
As is the case in most parts of the world, mayors are the face of urban local government 
in Zimbabwe. In the first two decades into independence, the ZANU-PF led national 
government was largely tolerant of mayors, the exception being Patrick Kombayi. After 
the formation of a strong opposition, the  MDC, and its subsequent hold on power at the 
local level, the ZANU-PF led national government began to utilise a number of 
procedures meant to weaken the institution of the mayoral office, including the 
abolition of the executive mayoral system in 2008. The stature of the mayoral office 
was, however, not significantly dented by this process as mayors remain influential. In 
response, the ZANU-PF led national government has largely been intolerant of mayors, 
especially those aligned to the MDC, at the expense of public service delivery. Mayors 
are often suspended and/or dismissed. Most of the suspensions which took place 
between 2000 and 2008 were followed by dismissals without due process of law being 
properly followed. The spirit of working together during the term of the GNU (2009-
2013) was not enough to prevent the suspension and/or dismissal of mayors 
arbitrarily.  
The adoption of the new Constitution in 2013 did not end such arbitrary 
suspensions and dismissals.  This is mainly due to three factors. First, legislation 
adopted to implement the 2013 Constitution does not give adequate protection to 
locally elected officials as required by the 2013 Constitution. The suspension and 
dismissal of mayors after the adoption of the new Constitution in 2013 demonstrate 
that the Local Government Amendment Act of 2016 falls short of preventing the 
arbitrary removal of mayors. Secondly, a culture of exercising supervisory powers to 
target political “enemies” continues to be a defining feature of the system of local 
government under the new constitutional dispensation.  Lastly, the practice of 
disregarding the objective of legislative provisions when it suits the interests of national 
politicians continues to thrive unabatedly. The selective exercise of the powers to 
suspend and/or dismiss mayors before and after the adoption of the new Constitution 
supports these claims. Therefore, it appears that the supervision of mayors in 
Zimbabwe has become enmeshed in an intricate web of power politics where political 
expediency appears to be trumping democratic decentralisation, particularly where 
there is vertically divided authority. This problem can be addressed by fully 
implementing the 2013 Constitution, including enacting legislation which protects and 
promotes local autonomy fully. However, such strong legislative provisions on local 
autonomy will mean very little unless they are respected in practice and court 
judgements protecting local autonomy are respected. There is a need to develop a 
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political culture under which opposition political parties are not perceived as inherently 
bad. Thus, tolerance of opposition politics is the first step towards promoting real 
democratic decentralisation in Zimbabwe and other African countries. 
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